Abstract-Testing security systems is challenging because a system's authors have to play the double role of attackers and defenders. Red Team/Blue Team exercises are an invaluable mechanism for security testing. They partition researchers into two competing teams of attackers and defenders, enabling them to create challenging and realistic test scenarios. While such exercises provide valuable insight into the vulnerabilities of security systems, they are very expensive and thus rarely performed. In this paper, we describe a Red Team/Blue Team exercise, sponsored by DARPA's FTN program, and performed October 2002 to May 2003. The goal of the exercise was to evaluate a collaborative DDoS defense, comprised of a distributed system, COSSACK, and a stand-alone defense, D-WARD. The role of the Blue Team was played by developers of the tested systems from USC/ISI and UCLA, the Red Team included researchers from Sandia National Laboratories, and all of the coordination, experiment execution, result collection, and analysis were performed by the White Team from BBN Technologies. This exercise was of immense value to all involved-it uncovered significant vulnerabilities in tested systems, pointed out desirable characteristics in DDoS defense systems (e.g., avoiding reliance on timing mechanisms), and taught us many lessons about testing of DDoS defenses.
INTRODUCTION
T ESTING of security systems is very challenging. The goal of the testing process is twofold: 1) It must prove that the system protects against some target threat, in various settings, with satisfactory performance and 2) it must prove that the system cannot be circumvented by an attacker who is familiar with the design. In most cases, the testing is performed by system designers who alternate between the attacker's role to design test scenarios and the defender's role to improve the deficiencies revealed by the testing. Besides being psychologically challenging, this testing approach results in simple and incomplete tests because system designers are naturally biased toward proving that their system works. Therefore, they design scenarios that meet only the first goal of the testing process. Further, defense designers often make tacit assumptions about their system's behavior or working environment. These assumptions can develop into research "blind spots," where potential security flaws can lurk unseen. Because security systems in real deployment are challenged by motivated and skilled attackers, evaluating a system's robustness in realistic complex scenarios is of paramount importance.
Red Team testing formally separates researchers into teams taking on the attacker (Red Team) and the defender (Blue Team) roles [1] , [2] , which leads to more realistic test scenarios. Blue Team members are defense designers who provide extensive design documentation and live support to the Red Team before and during the testing process. The Red Team members study the security systems using documentation and small-scale experiments and then leverage the information gathered on the system's design to develop tests that aim at circumventing or disabling its operation. Naturally, the Blue Team and the Red Team strive for a different testing outcome. Blue Team members hope that the security system will prove resilient to all attacks, while Red Team members hope to find any security holes that have been overlooked by designers. To keep the testing process objective, sometimes a White Team is formed from a neutral third party and they are responsible for setting the rules of engagement, devising appropriate success measures, collecting statistics, and evaluating results. Red Team/Blue Team exercises are invaluable to system designers-they frequently result in discovery of deficiencies that are later fixed, thus leading to more robust systems. However, they are quite costly because they require the engagement and close synchronization of many people for a considerable time.
From October 2002 to May 2003, we participated in a Red Team/Blue Team exercise, sponsored by DARPA's Fault Tolerant Networking (FTN) program. The goal of the exercise was to first combine two related security systems-COSSACK [3] , developed by the Information Sciences Institute (USC/ISI), and D-WARD [4] , developed by UCLA-into a single defense and then to evaluate this defense in a variety of scenarios. The Blue Team members were researchers from USC/ISI and UCLA who have developed the COSSACK and the D-WARD systems, the Red Team consisted of researchers from Sandia National Laboratories, and the White Team consisted of researchers from BBN Technologies. The overall exercise lasted eight months and yielded many interesting insights about the tested systems, leading to improvements in their design. In this paper, we document our experiences from this exercise and summarize lessons learned.
This paper focuses on the Red Team/Blue Team exercise, not on the tested defenses. Specifically, we do not claim that our defenses are superior to other systems or that their combination is superior to each defense deployed individually. Instead, we describe how the testing process was designed and customized to the defenses, how the tests were run, and what we learned from them about defenses and about testing security systems on a large scale. Since Red Team testing is rare in the academic community, we hope this paper will help others who engage in such endeavors to replicate our successes and learn from our mistakes. We further note that tests presented in this paper are now old, but were representative of DDoS trends during the exercise. Further, some tests were designed specifically to stress-test the defense software, as is the goal during Red Team/Blue Team exercises, and do not reflect real-world attacks.
Both COSSACK and D-WARD are defenses against DDoS attacks, developed in DARPA's FTN program. During a DDoS attack, an attacker launches coordinated high-volume traffic from many compromised machines toward a common victim. The traffic interferes with the victim's operation and its legitimate users experience prohibitively slow replies or a complete service disruption. In addition to the challenges of security systems' testing discussed above, DDoS defense testing must overcome the challenge of scale. DDoS attacks involve anywhere from a few hundred to half a million attack machines, distributed all over the Internet. To realistically test a DDoS defense, we would need an Internet-scale testbed-an impossible goal. Instead, testers must select important characteristics of an attack scenario, such as traffic aggregation, attack dynamics, legitimate traffic mix, and similar, to faithfully reconstruct in a testbed. The selected features are then scaled down carefully to fit the testbed at the available size.
In Section 2, we describe the testing methodology used in the exercise. We provide a brief overview of the two defense systems and their integrated version in Section 3, sufficient to understand testing decisions and attack strategies. Section 4 provides more details about the experimental setup; the performance metrics for the defense evaluation are defined in Section 5. We provide results of the executed tests in Section 6 and recount lessons learned in Section 7.
TESTING METHODOLOGY
DARPA regularly encourages systematic testing efforts for the research projects that it currently funds and it has funded numerous Red Team/Blue Team exercises. To keep the cost of these exercises reasonable, defense tuning, attack development, and defense evaluation sometimes occur sequentially in separate phases. In the first phase, the Blue Team develops and tunes the tested system's code. Once developed, the code is frozen (further changes are forbidden) and handed over, with all supporting documentation, to the Red Team. In the second phase, the Red Team analyzes the system code, designs attacks to stress the system and exploit vulnerabilities, and tests them in small-scale scenarios. Sometimes the final tests are automated so that they can be run by the White Team in the third phase. The White Team also organizes and coordinates the entire exercise, which includes testing infrastructure design and implementation, experiment planning, equipment setup, execution of experiments, and data analysis. While there is extensive communication between teams during the entire exercise, the separation of tasks into sequential phases reduces costs because it minimizes the need for simultaneous live engagement of all three teams.
The The Red Team/Blue Team exercise employed a single large topology consisting of nine disjoint edge networks containing a mix of routers, clients, and servers. Some networks deployed the modified COSSACK/D-WARD system. The evaluation consisted of presenting various mixes of benign (a result of normal network operation) and malign (attack) traffic to the instrumented edge networks and assessing the protection offered by the combined actions of COSSACK/D-WARD systems.
The central metric employed in the exercise was the availability of service to legitimate traffic: If this metric was significantly below the value observed in the absence of attacks, the attacks were considered to have succeeded. Since a complete assessment must also characterize the operational cost of employing COSSACK/D-WARD, statistics such as the rate of false positives and false negatives, the speed of response in detecting and responding to an attack, and any loss in bandwidth of a defended network were also collected.
Rules of Engagement
At the experiment planning phase, it was agreed that the Red Team would observe the following rules of engagement:
1. Because some security aspects of the existing COSSACK and D-WARD software, which are not relevant to their ability to detect and respond to DDoS attacks, were not yet implemented (such as protecting themselves from attack), those capabilities were assumed for the duration of the experiment. Attacks intended to directly disable the defensive technology (e.g., crash it by presenting it with malformed network traffic, kill processes on a machine, etc.) were off limits. Attacks intended to defeat the defensive technology through means other than its normal operating environment and conditions (e.g., by modifying its configuration files that contain detection parameters) were also off limits. This means that the main goal of Red Team attacks was to evade detection or response by COSSACK/D-WARD while still creating a significant denial of service (DoS) on legitimate traffic, rather than to directly attack the defense system. 2. Attacks targeting routers were off limits as they were not protected by the defense. 3. Since D-WARD functionality encompasses ingress filtering [5] , random spoofing from COSSACK/D-WARD deploying networks could easily be detected. For this reason, the Red Team was allowed to perform only subnet spoofing from defended networks. Any spoofing from nondefended networks was permitted. 4. The Red Team was not allowed to attack unprotected subnets (not containing a defensive technology) or to launch intrasubnet attacks; both of these attack categories cannot be eliminated by the tested defense because they do not traverse it. 5. Application-level attacks (aka "flash crowds"),
where an attack consists of fully legitimate service requests, were forbidden as defenses were not designed to protect against them. To summarize: all attacks employed in this experiment were required to be of a DDoS nature, to be launched over network links observed by either COSSACK or D-WARD, and to be subject to D-WARD responses.
There were no limits on the reconnaissance and attack tools that could be employed and the Red Team had full knowledge of the entire system. The Blue Team was not permitted to manually change the underlying software, configuration, or defensive strategy once experimentation had started, to avoid the problem of any changes nullifying previous results.
DEFENSE SYSTEMS
In this section, we provide high-level details about the COSSACK and the D-WARD systems and their integration. Readers interested in learning more about COSSACK and D-WARD should refer to publications [3] and [4] .
COSSACK
COSSACK is a DDoS detection and response system. COSSACK components, called watchdogs, are located at the edge networks. Each watchdog monitors its own network and it shares information and coordinates actions with other watchdogs via a multicast framework yoid [6] to collectively combat DDoS attacks. Localized information can be gleaned using a variety of collection tools, such as SNMP statistics, Cisco NetFlow [7] , and IDS tools such as Snort [8] . The tested implementation of COSSACK uses Snort with a custom-developed plug-in which can be controlled by the watchdog dynamically during attacks.
When a DoS attack is launched against a COSSACKprotected network the following operations take place:
1. The watchdog at the victim edge network detects the attack at the ingress point. 2. The watchdog instructs the IDS (Snort) to compile source address information and attack signature data (rates, type of attack, etc.) into a message. 3. The watchdog multicasts this message to other watchdogs in the network. It also advertises an attack-specific multicast group.
4. Watchdogs representing the implicated source networks join the attack-specific multicast group and perform in-depth analysis of their outgoing flows to determine if attack machines exist within their infrastructure. 5. Source networks that identify attack machines deploy countermeasures to stop attack flows. Local responses will be dictated by the local policy and the information received from the victim network's watchdog.
COSSACK watchdogs rely on an existing intrusion detection system to detect attacks. In the tested system, a Snort [8] plug-in has been implemented for attack detection. Packets captured by Snort are guided through a series of processing steps, one of which is filtering against a rule database containing known attack patterns that are matched against the header and payload information. In the tested system, this rule base was static and was a reason behind COSSACK's failure to detect some simple attacks, such as TCP data flood with spoofed packets (see Section 6.2), whose traffic did not match the rules.
D-WARD
D-WARD is a source-end defense, installed at a gateway router between the deploying network (source network) and the rest of the Internet. D-WARD's goal is to detect outgoing attacks and to rate limit attack streams. At the same time, legitimate traffic must proceed undisturbed even when its destination is the alleged victim of the attack.
D-WARD monitors all packets passing through the gateway router and gathers statistics on two-way communication between the source network and the rest of the Internet. These statistics are mainly counts of packets and bytes going in each direction, in four traffic categories: TCP, UDP, ICMP, and other. Statistics are collected at the granularity of an aggregate flow and a connection, where the aggregate flow represents all traffic exchanged between a source network and a foreign host and the connection represents all traffic between two hosts and port numbers, where one host is within a source network and the other is a foreign host. Periodically, statistics are compared to models of normal traffic that mainly test if the amount and context of the reverse traffic match the amount and context of the outgoing traffic.
D-WARD classifies TCP and ICMP flows or connections as part of an attack if the ratio of packets sent to packets received, smoothed over a suitable period, is higher than a specified threshold. Otherwise, such flows and connections are classified as "good." For UDP flows, several criteria are used to determine if the flow is an attack. These include the number of connections to a given destination, the number of packets per connection, and the maximum sending rate. The values of these are compared to thresholds to determine if the flow is an attack. At the time the testing was performed, D-WARD only classified UDP flows, not UDP connections. If an attack was detected, all UDP connections were rate limited.
The rate limit is set for flows that do not match normal traffic models and it is based on their past behavior and aggressiveness. D-WARD forwards outgoing packets to their destination if one of the following three conditions hold: 1) They do not belong to a rate-limited flow, 2) they belong to a rate-limited flow but are part of a good connection, and 3) they belong to a rate-limited flow and there is sufficient available bandwidth.
COSSACK/D-WARD Combined
In the combined operation, COSSACK and D-WARD both perform detection of DDoS attacks, but only D-WARD deploys responses to those attacks. Each edge network in the exercise runs both a COSSACK watchdog and a D-WARD system. When the local watchdog near the victim detects an attack, it sends alerts to remote watchdogs using COSSACK's multicast mechanisms.
The COSSACK message carries information about the type of the attack, the IP of the machine under attack, IP ranges of networks that COSSACK believes are sources of the attack, a suggested rate limit for D-WARD to impose, and a flag showing whether this is a message concerning a new, ongoing, or aborted attack. If a local watchdog determines that the network it covers is on the list of suspect source networks, it will forward the message to its collocated D-WARD system.
The D-WARD's response to a COSSACK message depends on the type of the message and any existing knowledge of the attack specified in the message. In the case of newly detected UDP attacks, D-WARD regards COS-SACK's detection signal as authoritative and will impose the requested rate limit on the attack. This rate limit will be regulated only through COSSACK's messages, i.e., it will be removed instantly when COSSACK detects the end of the UDP attack. In the case of a newly detected TCP or ICMP attack, D-WARD accepts the attack signal but invokes its own rate-limiting algorithm to calculate the appropriate rate limits. Similarly, messages about the attack's end are regarded as a signal that the rate limits should be slowly lifted. This difference in handling TCP/ICMP and UDP attacks was engineered because our preliminary tests indicated that D-WARD's detection of TCP/ICMP attacks was more accurate than COSSACK's, while COSSACK was more accurate in detecting UDP attacks. Our experimental results have shown, however, that D-WARD was overall more accurate in detecting attacks and did not benefit from being integrated with COSSACK.
EXPERIMENT SETUP AND SCENARIOS

Topology
The experimental topology consisted of nine edge networks connected by a core network, which was simulated by a multiported Cisco router. The topology is shown in Fig. 1 and hardware specifics of nodes in the topology are given in Table 1 . The system had three types of components: 1) clients (F 1-20) and servers (S 1-6) residing on different edge networks, 2) edge network border routers deploying COSSACK and D-WARD (C 1-9 and D 1-9), and 3) a core network consisting of a router only. Each edge network's clients and servers exchanged legitimate traffic, consisting of TCP, UDP, and ICMP packets, over the core network, with the clients and servers on the other edge networks. During attacks, some clients were subverted and played the role of attackers.
This topology consisted of more real machines than was typical in DDoS testing at the time, but still far fewer machines than are involved in real-world DDoS attacks. It is worth considering if experiment results would be any different if a larger, more realistic testbed were available. In a larger network, an attacker (or, in our case, the Red Team) could send at a higher rate, distributing the attack so that smaller numbers of packets would be sent from larger numbers of sites. Rolling floods (Section 6.3) could also cycle through larger numbers of nodes. COSSACK's attack detection was rule-based and would likely be as effective in a large network as in a smaller one. COSSACK's multicast mechanism would be challenged if it supported large-scale communication. In D-WARD experiments described in [4] , it was shown that the defense successfully detects and controls low-rate attacks if they inflict DoS effect at the victim. Rolling floods, however, would be successful because they exploit timing in D-WARD's design. We are not aware of any existing DDoS defenses that can handle large-scale distributed rolling floods. The administrative challenges of running this exercise with our current topology were significant. Even if a much larger testbed were available, it would likely be hard to organize a Red Team/Blue Team exercise of such scale.
Legitimate Traffic
The Skaion traffic generation system [9] was utilized in this exercise to provide legitimate traffic. The traffic was generated using semiautonomous software agents or bots. Bots are deployed on a set of traffic generation machines and they can interact with each other or with live hosts during experimentation. Bots are driven by a broad stochastic representation of a desired traffic mix they work to recreate and use real applications for traffic generation, such as Telnet, SSH, and Web applications.
A single traffic generation machine can run multiple bots, each acting as a virtual host and having a dedicated IP address. Multiple traffic generation machines can be orchestrated to generate traffic from thousands of virtual hosts by running a slave module on each machine and coordinating all slave activities via a single master module run on a separate control machine.
In our exercise, there were three traffic generators (TG 1-3 in Fig. 1 ), each running multiple bots. These hosts were connected together via the out-of-band network (denoted with bold lines in Fig. 1 ) that was off-limits to both legitimate message traffic and attack by the Red Team. All network links had 10 Mbps bandwidth, with the exception 
TABLE 1 Configurations of Machines Involved in the Exercise
of the traffic generation network, which was configured to run at 100 Mbps speed.
Attacks
The task of the Red Team was to design attacks that measurably degrade or deny availability of network resources on one or more edge-networks. Degradation implies a decrease in the throughput of traffic to and from an edgenetwork, relative to the throughput observed in the absence of an attack. Denial implies that the services of an edgenetwork are no longer available despite the actions of COSSACK/D-WARD. The Red Team focused on attacks that stress or bypass defenses; thus tests did not include partial deployment scenarios or scenarios that test scalability of defenses. Specifically, for partial deployment scenarios, both COSSACK and D-WARD deploy a response close to the sources of attack. If some attackers reside in networks that do not run D-WARD or COSSACK, their traffic will reach the victim unhindered and, if its volume suffices, it will create DoS. Since all links in our experiment were 10 Mbps, they could be flooded by a single attack machine generating large packets (1,200 byte packets map into 1; 042 packets per second that can easily be generated by a single machine). In the real Internet, larger link capacity in networks hosting servers (frequently > 1 Gbps), and a smaller link capacity of bots (according to [10] , an average bot can generate at most 100 Kbps) map into the requirement of at least 10,000 bots that need to be located in legacy networks for a successful flooding attack. Additionally, a host under TCP SYN flood attack that does not deploy syncookies can be brought down by roughly 100 packets per second, which can be generated by a single attack machine.
Special care was taken to ensure that attack code cannot "escape" the experimental environment, either accidentally or by real attackers compromising experimental hosts and stealing the code to reuse it later in real attacks. All of the executable codes for attacks were uploaded to the experimental network via SSH over VPN. The attack code had no inherent propagation capabilities of its own and, thus, could not self-propagate if it were accidentally released. Further, all attack codes that generate IP packets contained algorithms to filter all outgoing packets with addresses other than those used in the exercise. All hosts in the exercise were assigned globally nonroutable addresses.
Attack Strategy Development. Chronologically, the attack strategy was developed in the following manner:
1. Attacks were postulated and categorized into general classes. 2. Attacks were either discarded because the teams agreed that they were off limits or chosen for full development and testing on standalone systems and lightweight networks. 3. Reconnaissance was performed on a live network.
This reconnaissance did not use the final network that was utilized for the experiment, but instead a smaller network located at the Red Team's institution. The consequences of different implementation platforms later created much difficulty because some developed attack strategies were not as effective in the real experiment as they were in the reconnaissance phase. 4. Attacks were tested and refined on the reconnaissance network. 5. Attacks were turned over to the White Team for execution, data collection, and analysis.
Classes of Postulated Attacks. 1) Timing attacks, which capitalized on temporal interdependencies between software components, network timing characteristics, etc. Since the nature of the defensive technology-and the underlying DDoS problem itself-is highly temporal in nature, the majority of attack strategies had either a basis in, or at least an important component of, timing strategy. 2) Communicating attack threads (Smart Mobs)-the Red Team conjectured that attacks which implemented an intelligent communication strategy to coordinate their activities would be more successful than brute-force attacks. 3) Synergies achieved through simultaneous attacks-attacks were hypothesized in which the combined effects, and, hence, likelihood of success, of multiple attacks would be greater than the effects of any of the individual attacks. Since the defensive technologies were assumed to detect and respond to bruteforce attacks, the synergies sought resulted in subtler, stealthier attack behavior.
Discarded Attacks. A variety of existing attacks and "outof-the-box" tools were considered. Ultimately, the Red Team developed its customized attack tools that combined useful attack strategies from out-of-the-box tools, but were more easily manipulated and customized during exercise.
Attack Packet "Labeling". To enable analysis of the network traffic captured during experiment runs, the Red Team agreed to "label" packets that its tools were generating. This packet labeling allowed categorization of packets as either normal or attack traffic by the White Team instrumentation that collected the experiment's statistics. The marks were used for statistics collection purposes only. Both COSSACK and D-WARD ignored the packet labels.
Several techniques were explored to achieve packet labeling. Eventually, a technique was selected by which the IP timestamp option bit was added to the attack packet IP headers and all attacks were developed using this labeling. Later, when attack scripts were ported from the Red Team's network to the experimental network, which used a Cisco router, it was discovered that the Cisco 3600-family routers exercised different processing paths for normal packets (which did not contain the IP timestamp option) than for attack packets. These different processing paths affected both the priority of packets passing through the routers and the speed with which packets were processed. To address this problem, the Red Team attack tools were eventually modified to use the Type of Service (TOS) field in the IP headers for labeling. This technique allowed positive identification of attack traffic packets.
Experiment Control
Experiment control and data collection was coordinated from the experiment control host (labeled Access in Fig. 1 ). This host executed the BBN experimentation framework.
PERFORMANCE METRICS
This experiment employed two principal performance metrics: 1) a fraction of the legitimate traffic throughput maintained, measured as percentages of different kinds of legitimate traffic maintained at the preattack levels by the defensive system and 2) whether the DDoS attack was detected and responded to. Several additional submetrics were useful for characterizing various aspects of the defenses:
1. the rate of false-positive and false-negative detections, 2. the time to detection, measured as the amount of time from the attack launch until the system decides it is indeed an attack, 3. the time to respond, measured as the amount of time from attack detection until the legitimate traffic returns to a baseline level, and 4. the severity of the attack-the damage inflicted on legitimate traffic in an undefended system. These performance metrics were chosen at the time and agreed upon by all team members. Several years later, team members Reiher, Hussain, and Mirkovic worked with collaborators from SPARTA and Purdue University to develop novel, more accurate metrics for measuring DoS in experiments. That work is described in [11] , but, since detailed packet traces from our Red Team/Blue Team exercise were not preserved, we cannot apply new metrics to the experiments described in this paper.
Further, the experiment methodology did not permit us to analyze higher level effects of attacks. Thus, we do not know and cannot determine if defense actions tended to cause some connections be dropped completely or all connections to receive degraded service. Based on our understanding of D-WARD's functionality, we believe the latter was the case.
Data Validation
Data validation was performed by repeatedly executing runs to ensure that the results obtained were consistent. Each experiment was run five times. The first four iterations used four different seed values for random number generation needed for traffic generators and the fifth iteration repeated the initial seed value. The different seed values provided for statistical variation of the data. Unfortunately, only results from single test runs were kept after the exercise and used for the final report and for this paper. Thus, our graphs reflect results from single runs and lack confidence intervals.
RESULTS
In this section, we show selected experimental results from all tested attacks and discuss defense performance in detail. All attacks generate packets with random contents except for HTTP flood attacks which generate valid HTTP requests.
Baseline-No Attack
The baseline runs have no attacks present and consist of only legitimate traffic. There were three different legitimate traffic levels that were used to test false positives introduced by the defense systems-low, high, and mixed. The high traffic pattern used approximately 10 percent of the available bandwidth, the low traffic pattern used approximately 2 percent of the available bandwidth, and the mixed traffic pattern started at the low level and, after 10 min, increased to the high level to simulate a sudden change in traffic behavior. Each baseline was run for 20 minutes.
Each traffic mix was run without any defense, with D-WARD only, with COSSACK only, and with the integrated COSSACK/D-WARD system. The behavior of the system with only COSSACK running is equivalent to the behavior of the system with neither defensive system running as only D-WARD can implement responses. Table 3 summarizes the average baseline behavior in each configuration. In each case, 99.8 percent to 100 percent of the traffic sent was received. In the low traffic pattern runs, there was essentially no difference in the average number of packets received with or without defenses. Under the mixed and the high traffic pattern, slightly lower average numbers of packets were received with defenses, indicating packet loss due to false detections.
Figs. 2a, 2b, and 2c show packet counts received at subnet 1 over the duration of the experimental run, in 30 seconds intervals. The time is shown on the x-axis, relative to the start of the run. The majority of the traffic is TCP and the number of UDP packets is generally fairly consistent for the duration of the run. The low traffic pattern sends about 15 percent and the mixed traffic pattern sends about 45 percent of the traffic sent with the high traffic pattern. Table 4 summarizes the average number of false positive detections, actions, and classifications from the attack-free baseline runs when both defensive configurations were running. COSSACK did not have any false positive detections during the baseline runs, while D-WARD had some false positives. Therefore, runs with only COSSACK deployed are false positive-free, while runs when only D-WARD is deployed have identical results with runs when both systems are active. The "detections" field in the table shows the number of false attack detections per run and the "actions" field shows the duration of rate-limiting, calculated from the moment when a rate limit is imposed on the flow to the moment it is removed. Since the rate limit is changing dynamically, a flow may not experience drops even if it is rate-limited. The fields "TCP/UDP misclassified" show the average percentage of TCP and UDP connections that were not classified as "good" and, therefore, could experience packet loss due to defensive actions if any actions are triggered. In a case when no false-positive detections occur, no packets will be dropped from these connections.
The overall frequency of false positive detections was very low: We have, at most, four false attack detections during the experiment. Also, we observed that higher traffic loads caused the false detection rate to increase significantly (0 with low traffic load, 2 with mixed, and 4 with high traffic load). Falsely triggered defensive actions lasted for about half a minute. Misclassifications fluctuated in the range 0.47 percent to 0.79 percent and there was no clear correlation between the number of misclassifications and the traffic rate. Since, overall, less than 0.2 percent of traffic was dropped by the defenses during baseline tests, we conclude that the defense actions did not have a large negative impact on the performance and that they were able to effectively handle changes in the average network load. In the rest of this paper, we show the results of experiments performed with the combined COSSACK/D-WARD defense and the high traffic baseline mix.
Spoofing Floods
In spoofing floods, attack machines spoof source addresses from the /24 subnet where the machine is located. In each of the spoofing flood attacks, the attackers were on subnets 4, 5, 6, and 7 and one server host on subnet 1 was being attacked. There were four tested attacks: Spoofing Flood TCP, Spoofing Flood UDP, Spoofing Flood ICMP, and Spoofing Flood All. The first three attacks generate TCP, UDP, and ICMP flood, respectively. The fourth attack generates a random mix of traffic using these three protocols. The goal of these attacks is to consume network bandwidth at the victim, so they generate 1,200 byte packets to target the bandwidth with a few packets per second. This packet size was chosen arbitrarily. It is close to the maximum packet size of 1,500 bytes for the Ethernet medium used in the experiment. The TCP flood uses TCP data packets. We test a TCP SYN flood in Section 6.6. Each attack machine sends packets as quickly as its Ethernet device allows. In each attack scenario, four attack machines flood one server machine.
Expected outcome. From the defense system specifications, the Red Team expected that these attacks will be effectively detected and controlled. They were included in the tests for completeness and to demonstrate the system's operation under simple floods.
Summary of results. Table 2 summarizes the results of test runs with spoofing attacks, showing the effect on legitimate traffic as a percentage of the baseline case. In the table, the reduction in the rate at which the victim receives legitimate traffic in the presence of an attack is subdivided into two categories: 1) The reduction in network transport rate refers to the amount of good traffic that was erroneously dropped by the defenses and not received by the victim subnet.
2) The reduction in source generation rate refers to the drop in the quantity of good traffic the traffic generator was able to send, as compared to the baseline case, due to network congestion slowing down good TCP traffic generation. The rate of legitimate traffic at the victim is the product of these two rates. TABLE 3  Average Baseline Throughput   TABLE 4 False Detections, Actions, and Misclassifications per Run Fig. 3a compares the amount of legitimate traffic received at victim subnet 1 against the amount of legitimate traffic sent to subnet 1 for a Spoofing Flood UDP attack with a defended system. After the attack starts, this percentage drops sharply for several seconds while the attack is being detected and the defense system is calibrating a response. After this initial disruption, legitimate traffic is being well protected by the defense and the percentage returns to values close to 100 percent. As Table 2 shows, approximately 97 percent of the legitimate traffic sent during the attack was received at the victim. The traffic generators sent 90 percent of the baseline traffic level. Thus, in this run, the amount of traffic received by subnet 1 was 87 percent of what it received in the baseline case, yielding a 13 percent net loss. The defended system showed a significant improvement over the undefended system, where the transport rate was 38 percent, the source rate was 13 percent of the baseline, and the victim network only received 5 percent of the baseline traffic as a result of the congestion in the network, yielding a 95 percent net loss. D-WARD detected and responded to this attack since the attack created sufficient disturbance in the sent-to-received packet ratio needed for D-WARD's attack detection and separation of legitimate from attack connections. COSSACK did not detect this attack because static Snort rules did not match the attack traffic. The defenses were able to throttle the attack within 10 seconds. Fig. 4 shows results for the Spoofing Flood ICMP attack. In addition to the initial service disruption while the attack was being detected, there was another period of poor service at about 550 seconds. This occurred because the defense erroneously detected the end of the attack and initiated the rate limit increase, allowing the attack to disrupt legitimate traffic's service when the rate limit became sufficiently high. Afterward, the defense detected the attack for the second time and reestablished the rate limit, restoring good service to legitimate traffic.
For space reasons, we do not show figures for the Spoofing Flood TCP and Spoofing Flood All attacks. The defense responded to Spoofing Flood TCP in a way similar to its response to Spoofing Flood UDP. The response to Spoofing Flood All was very similar to the response to Spoofing Flood ICMP.
The Red Team's commentary on the results. The defenses were very effective against the baseline spoofing attacks, as expected. In all four attacks, the baseline traffic was reduced to about 5 percent of its original volume in the presence of an attack without the defensive software, but to about 80 percent with the defensive software operational. Over the duration of the experiment runs, these percentages remained fairly consistent, indicating the network as a whole reached a steady state reasonably quickly.
Rolling Floods
These attacks take advantage of the timing involved in the COSSACK/D-WARD system. Red Team experiments indicated that it took approximately 5 seconds for attack traffic to be completely throttled by D-WARD and it took approximately 60 seconds without attack for COSSACK to clear a machine's "bad" reputation. Rolling flood attacks coordinate several flooding agents to take advantage of these timing characteristics. Each agent cycles through its targets, flooding them for 5-6 seconds, and then lies dormant for a 60 seconds period. These attacks are similar to pulsing floods [12] .
The rolling flood attack was split into several attacks to test the following hypotheses separately: 1) A target can be flooded continuously throughout the entire time window. 2) A target's services can be effectively degraded for most of the time window. The rolling attacks each generate TCP, UDP, or ICMP packets in a random mix and use subnet spoofing. Each attack machine floods as quickly as its Ethernet device allows. In general, there were seven to eight attackers targeting one to two servers throughout the attack.
Expected outcome. Since these attacks rely on timing to trick defense systems, spoofing and shifting between subnets, it was expected that they should be successful most of the time.
Summary of results. Table 2 summarizes the results of the rolling attacks. The attacks have a severity rating of medium because they did not have as large an impact on the undefended system as did the spoofing flood attacks.
In the Roll-1 attack, there was one attacker in each subnet, 3 through 9, each attacking in sequence, one at a time, for 5 seconds. Attack packets had a random payload size between 500 and 1,000 bytes, not including protocol headers. Fig. 5a compares the amount of legitimate traffic received at subnet 1 against the amount of legitimate traffic sent to subnet 1 for a defended system. As with the spoofing flood attacks, this percentage is close to 1 most of the time, but the variance is larger, indicating that the protection is sporadic rather than stable. According to Table 2 , the source generated 91 percent of the baseline traffic level and the network transport rate was 96 percent during the attack, resulting in the victim receiving 87 percent as much legitimate traffic as in the baseline case (for a loss of 13 percent). In the undefended system, the source generated 56 percent of the baseline traffic level and the network transport rate was 91 percent during the attack, resulting in the victim receiving 51 percent as much legitimate traffic as in the baseline case (for a loss of 49 percent). This attack had a smaller impact against the undefended system than the spoofing flood attacks because it did not send as much traffic to the victim. The defense needed 145 seconds to fully throttle the attack. Both D-WARD and COSSACK detected this attack since both sent-to-received packet ratios were abnormal and Snort rules were matched.
The Roll-1-Large attack is a modified Roll-1 attack with an increased payload size of 1,200 bytes. Fig. 6a compares the amount of legitimate traffic received at victim network 1 against the amount of legitimate traffic sent to network 1 for a defended system. Some legitimate traffic was dropped during the defense stabilization period at around 270 seconds. According to Table 2 , the source generated 91 percent of the baseline traffic level and the network transport rate was 94 percent during the attack, resulting in the victim receiving 85 percent as much legitimate traffic as in the baseline case (for a loss of 15 percent). In the undefended system, the source generated 50 percent of the baseline traffic level and the network transport rate was 90 percent during the attack, resulting in the victim receiving 45 percent as much legitimate traffic as in the baseline case (for a loss of 55 percent). The impact of this attack was somewhat larger than the impact of the Roll-1 attack because of a larger packet size. The defense needed 223 seconds to fully throttle the attack. D-WARD detected this attack, while COSSACK did not. Again, D-WARD's success can be attributed to abnormal sent-to-received packet ratios created by this attack, while COSSACK failed to detect the attack because it did not match its static Snort rules.
Figs. 5b, 5c, 6b, and 6c compare the levels of legitimate and attack traffic received at the victim network in the defended and the undefended configurations for Roll-1 and Roll-1-Large attacks. In the defended network, the legitimate traffic level was comparable to the baseline case, while it was about 50 percent lower in the undefended network.
In the Roll-2 attack, there was one attacker in each subnet, 3 through 9, with two attackers always simultaneously attacking for five consecutive seconds. This attack is thus a modified Roll-1 attack with a doubled rate. Fig. 7a shows the percentage of the legitimate traffic received at subnet 1 for a defended system. The defense stabilization period, at the onset of the attack, lasted for about 65 seconds, with heavy drops inflicted on legitimate traffic. Afterward, the defense delivered a high percentage of legitimate traffic to the victim. The source generated 92 percent of the baseline traffic level and the network transport rate was 93 percent during the attack, resulting in the victim receiving 85 percent as much legitimate traffic as in the baseline case (for a loss of 15 percent). In the undefended system, the source generated 35 percent of the baseline traffic level and the network transport rate was 79 percent during the attack, resulting in the victim receiving 28 percent as much legitimate traffic as in the baseline case (for a loss of 72 percent). The Roll-2 had a greater impact against an undefended system than the Roll-1 attack because it sent more traffic to the victim. The defenses needed 65 s to throttle the attack. D-WARD detected this attack, while COSSACK did not.
The Roll-2-Large attack modifies the Roll-2 attack by increasing the payload size to 1,200 bytes, so this is a Roll-1-Large attack with a doubled rate. Fig. 8a shows the percentage of the legitimate traffic received at subnet 1 for a defended system. This percentage varied not only during the defense stabilization period (96 seconds) but also from time 300 seconds continuously until the end of the attack. These variations indicate that a defense was constantly readjusting to the changing attack traffic and was inflicting periodic legitimate drops. The source generated 93 percent of the baseline and the network transport rate was 93 percent during the attack, resulting in the victim receiving 86 percent as much legitimate traffic as in the baseline case. In the undefended system, the source generated 33 percent of the baseline traffic level and the network transport rate was 76 percent during the attack, resulting in the victim receiving 25 percent as much legitimate traffic as in the baseline case. Of the rolling attacks, this attack had the greatest impact on the undefended system. The defense needed 96 seconds to throttle the attack. D-WARD detected this attack, but COSSACK did not. The explanation for defense performance in the case of Roll-2 and Roll-2-Large is the same as in the case of the Roll-1-Large attack.
Figs. 7b, 7c, 8b, and 8c compare legitimate and attack traffic received at the victim network in the defended and the undefended configurations for Roll-2 and Roll-2-Large. The legitimate traffic level in the defended system was comparable to the baseline after the initial stabilization period. In the undefended system, the service was significantly impaired by the attack.
The Roll-3-Large attack modified the Roll-2-Large attack by also attacking subnet 2 in addition to subnet 1. Figs. 9a and 9d compare the percentage of legitimate traffic received at subnet 1 and at subnet 2 for a defended system. After the initial stabilization period of about 50 seconds, the defenses managed to keep this percentage high in both networks, but with a large variance (especially in the case of subnet 2), which indicates sporadic collateral damage. For the defended subnet 1, the source generated 94 percent of the baseline traffic level and the network transport rate was 96 percent during the attack, resulting in the victim receiving 90 percent as much legitimate traffic as in the baseline case (for a loss of 10 percent). In the undefended configuration in subnet 1, the source generated 41 percent of the baseline traffic level and the network transport rate was 83 percent during the attack, resulting in the victim receiving 34 percent as much legitimate traffic as in the baseline case (for a loss of 66 percent). In the defended configuration in subnet 2, the source generated 89 percent of the baseline traffic level and the network transport rate was 95 percent of the baseline traffic level, resulting in the victim receiving 85 percent as much legitimate traffic as in the baseline case (for a loss of 15 percent). In the undefended system in subnet 2, the source generated 33 percent of the baseline traffic level and the network transport rate was 87 percent of the baseline traffic level, resulting in the victim receiving 29 percent as much legitimate traffic as in the baseline case (for a loss of 71 percent).
Figs. 9b, 9c, 9e, and 9f compare the levels of legitimate and attack traffic received at the victim network 1 and network 2 in the defended and the undefended configurations. In the defended system, the legitimate traffic level was comparable to the baseline, while it was much lower in the undefended system. COSSACK only detected this attack as originating from subnet 9 because this subnet sent more attack traffic than the others, which triggered COSSACK's alarms. D-WARD detected the attack in all involved subnets because of the consequent increase in the sent-to-received packet ratio from those subnets to the victim. The defense took 49 seconds to throttle the attack on subnet 1 and 50 seconds to throttle the attack on subnet 2.
The Red Team's commentary on the results. The percentage of legitimate traffic reaching its destination in the presence of an attack, but without defensive software, was far higher than either anticipated or observed in the previous spoofing attacks. In all variations of the rolling attacks, this number was no less than 25 percent of the original figure (as opposed to only 5 percent as experienced during the spoofing attacks). A larger attack rate should have been generated to achieve higher service denial. With the defensive technology operational, legitimate traffic loads returned to the 80-90 percent levels as seen with spoofing attacks, indicating the technology was not "fooled" by this attack strategy or the specific timings used for these particular experiments. This suggests that the attacks were not optimally orchestrated for the final experiment configuration because the reconnaissance network was different from the one used in the testing phase. The time needed by defenses to detect and respond to these attacks led the Red Team to speculate that a more careful orchestration of rolling attacks could result in sustained service denial.
HTTP Flood Attacks
These attacks generated a long stream of bogus HTTP requests that aimed to use up a target's resources in generating responses. The Red Team observed that two attacking machines were sufficient to degrade service from a single server machine. No traffic was spoofed and these attacks were not run separately, but in conjunction with other packet-flooding attacks.
Expected outcome. At a high rate, this attack should degrade the target's HTTP service. At a moderate rate, this attack should provide seemingly legitimate decoy traffic that should slow down detection or response of a defense system to another, more potent attack interleaved with the HTTP flood.
HTTP-Rolling Attacks
This attack is a combination of the rolling flood Roll-1-Large and the HTTP flood. The rolling flood provides the majority of the attack traffic, while the HTTP flood (run at a slower speed) attempts to provide "legitimate" traffic from the attacking network to redeem it at the defense system. The attackers are on the same subnets as in the Roll-1-Large attack.
Expected outcome. This attack should degrade service in a manner similar to the rolling flood, but the use of HTTP "redeeming" traffic should cause a slowdown in the defense response.
Summary of results. Table 2 summarizes the results of the HTTP-Roll attacks. The HTTP-Roll attack has a severity rating of medium because it did not severely degrade service to legitimate clients. In the defended configuration, the source generated 95 percent of the baseline traffic level and the network transport rate was 96 percent during the attack, resulting in the victim receiving 91 percent as much legitimate traffic as in the baseline case (for a loss of 9 percent). In the undefended system, the source generated 56 percent of the baseline traffic level and the network transport rate was 89 percent during the attack, resulting in the victim receiving 50 percent as much legitimate traffic as in the baseline case (for a loss of 50 percent). Fig. 10a shows the percentage of legitimate traffic received at network 1 for a defended system. The stabilization period was longer than for spoofing and rolling attacks -around 250 seconds. Afterward, the defense offered stable and good protection to legitimate traffic. Figs. 10b and 10c compare the levels of legitimate and attack traffic received at the victim network 1 in the defended and the undefended configurations. The legitimate traffic was lower than the baseline during the defense stabilization period, but it matched the baseline level afterward. The undefended network had a significantly lower legitimate traffic level. D-WARD detected this attack everywhere, while COSSACK did not. D-WARD's success can be attributed to the fact that excessive attack traffic created an increase of the sent-to-received packet ratio, which triggered D-WARD's action. COSSACK's failure to 
Connection Attacks
Each operating system has a hard limit on the number of TCP connections that can be simultaneously active because the state table used by the OS to store connection data is of limited size. Connection attacks aim to consume the space in this table by creating half-open TCP connections. The attack machine sends spoofed TCP SYN packets that lead to connection record allocation at the target, which replies with a TCP SYNACK. The attacker ignores these replies (hence the term "half-open" connection) and the allocated connection records eventually time out in the absence of any activity. This attack is known in the literature as a TCP SYN flood attack [13] .
The overall effect of the connection attack is that the target cannot serve new users of the application whose port is under attack. Although the attack's effect is limited to new TCP traffic, this does not discount its significance as the majority of network traffic is TCP. The connection attack in this exercise flooded each port on the target machine. The attack was run in conjunction with other packet-flooding attacks.
Expected outcome. This attack should deny service to new TCP connections and should not be detected by defenses.
Connection-Rolling Attacks
These attacks are a combination of the rolling flood and the connection flood. It was hypothesized that the effectiveness of the connection flood was limited because only service to new TCP connections is denied, while existing connections and non-TCP traffic proceed unharmed. The rolling flood attack was meant to affect these other kinds of legitimate traffic to result in a more effective DoS. The connection attack was combined with two rolling flood attacks, Roll-1-Large and Roll-2-Large, creating two test scenarios: ConnRoll-1 and Conn-Roll-2. The attack was launched from subnets 2-9 with a total of 11 attacking hosts, targeting a server in subnet 1.
Expected outcome. This attack should degrade service in a similar manner to the rolling flood, but with a higher level of impact on legitimate TCP traffic.
Summary of results. Table 2 summarizes the results of the Conn-Roll attacks. The Conn-Roll-1 attack has a severity rating of medium and the Conn-Roll-2 attack has a severity rating of mild. Both attacks impacted the service moderately. Fig. 11a shows the percentage of legitimate traffic received at network 1 for a defended system and ConnRoll-1 attack. Figs. 11b and 11c compare the levels of legitimate and attack traffic received at the victim network 1 in the defended and the undefended configurations. The Red Team used the nmap tool [14] to determine unused port numbers (so that the attack could skip these ports) and did not label the packets sent out by this tool. This accounts for higher-than-baseline legitimate traffic levels in the first 100 seconds in Figs. 11b and 11c . Much of this unlabeled traffic was dropped by the defenses and there was a noticeable drop in the amount of legitimate traffic sent and received. The defense stabilization period lasted for 300 seconds. Afterward, the defense protected ongoing TCP connections well, but new connections were still impaired by the connection flood attack. Approximately 82 percent of the legitimate traffic sent was received at the victim when the defenses were active. Including the source generation rate slowdown, the amount of traffic received by subnet 1 was 80 percent of what it received in the baseline case. However, these values are skewed as they assume that the nmap packets are good. Excluding the data from the first 5 minutes of the run, the source generated 57 percent of the baseline traffic level and the network transport rate was 92 percent during the attack, resulting in the victim receiving 52 percent as much legitimate traffic as in the baseline case. Breaking this down by protocol, 94 percent of the TCP traffic was received and 80 percent of the UDP traffic was received during this same time period. Thus, subnet 1 did exhibit a significant degradation of service as a result of this attack. In the undefended network, the source generated 40 percent of the baseline traffic level and the network transport rate was 91 percent during the attack, resulting in the victim receiving 36 percent as much legitimate traffic as in the baseline case.
Although the throughput of the legitimate traffic was similar in the defended and the undefended cases, the defenses prevented a majority of the attack traffic from reaching subnet 1 in the defended case. The defense needed 365 seconds to throttle the attack. D-WARD detected this attack, while COSSACK did not.
The Conn-Roll-2 attack was detected only by D-WARD at subnet 7 because that subnet had a slightly increased sentto-received packet ratio that triggered D-WARD's alarm. Consequently, defenses took very few responses. The legitimate traffic to subnet 1 was degraded and there was little difference between the defended and undefended cases (Figs. 12b and 12c) . The percentage of legitimate traffic received at network 1 for a defended system and the Conn-Roll-2 attack is shown in Fig. 12a .
The Red Team's commentary on the results. Connection floods in combination with the rolling attacks, especially once they were well underway (beyond 400 seconds into the experiment), appeared to be quite effective in blocking normal traffic despite the defensive technologies. In particular, once the experiment reached steady state, there was little difference in the throughput of normal traffic with or without the defense mechanisms running.
ACK Proxy Attacks
The Red Team decided early on that an interesting test scenario would include helper machines outside the attack or the victim networks who act in concert with attack machines to trick the defense. The idea was to spoof a TCP ACK for every TCP SYN packet sent to flood a target (this can be easily generalized to also work for TCP data packets). Each time an attacking machine sends out a TCP SYN packet to the target, it makes a request to a helper, who creates the ACK reply as if it were coming from the target of the TCP SYN flood. The spoofed ACK packets are meant to fool D-WARD's traffic classification mechanism and lead to classification of attack traffic as legitimate. This attack makes assumptions that there is no ingress/egress filtering or COSSACK/D-WARD on helper subnets.
For each ACK Proxy attack, four attack machines flood a single server. Each attack machine has a dedicated ACK server. Three ACK Proxy attacks were generated. In the ACK-Proxy-1 attack, for every malicious connection request, two SYN packets were sent from the flooding agent to the target and two spoofed ACK packets were sent from the ACK Proxy to the flooding agent. In ACK-Proxy-2, similar dynamics as in ACK-Proxy-1 were deployed, but the attack and ACK traffic rate were doubled. In the ACK-Proxy-3 attack, the rate was quadrupled compared to ACK-Proxy-1. In all three ACK Proxy attacks, the helper machines were located in subnets 3, 7, 8, and 9 that did not run defenses.
Expected outcome. This attack will not be detected and will generate enough traffic to degrade service.
Summary of results. Table 2 summarizes the results of the ACK Proxy attacks. The ACK-Proxy-1 attack has a severity rating of medium because the loss was 46 percent. The ACK-Proxy-2 and ACK-Proxy-3 attacks are rated as high severity because the losses were 90 percent and 95 percent, respectively.
For space reasons, we omitted figures for the ACK-Proxy attacks. There was essentially no difference in the system behavior in the defended and undefended cases: both in the amount of attack traffic and the amount of legitimate traffic received. In the defended configuration in the ACK-Proxy-1 attack, the source generated 56 percent of the baseline traffic level and the network transport rate was 97 percent during the attack, resulting in the victim receiving 54 percent as much legitimate traffic as in the baseline case (for a loss of 46 percent). In the undefended system, the source generated 56 percent of the baseline traffic level and the network transport rate was 96 percent during the attack, resulting in the victim receiving 54 percent as much legitimate traffic as in the baseline case (for a loss of 46 percent). COSSACK did detect this attack because it matched Snort rules; however, the combined system did not take any responses because D-WARD was fooled by the fake ACK replies and classified all attack traffic as good. Results for ACK-Proxy-2 and ACK-Proxy-3 look very similar to the results of ACK-Proxy-1-the defense detected the attack but did not take any responses. For space reasons, we omit the corresponding graphs, but we show the summary of results in Table 2 .
The Red Team's commentary on the results. This set of attacks was very effective against the defense technologies and behaved as the Red Team expected.
Experiment Conclusions
The Red Team's attacks were carefully designed to stresstest the COSSACK/D-WARD defense at its performance boundaries, progressively going from simple to more sophisticated attacks. The performance of defense decreased with attack sophistication. The defense was successful against simple Spoofing Flood attacks and even against more sophisticated Rolling attacks. The performance of the defense degraded somewhat when Rolling attacks were combined with connection and HTTP traffic in the HTTP-Roll and Conn-Roll attacks. On the other hand, these attacks did not severely degrade a victim's service in the undefended system because of their small aggregate rate. This small rate was dictated by the necessity to "roll" the attack and by the small number of edge hosts (20) in the experimental network-thus, a few hosts could be active attackers at any given time. The defense failed completely to respond to ACK Proxy attacks, although they were detected by the COSSACK system. This failure is linked to a D-WARD feature that classifies TCP connections as "good" if they receive sufficient acknowledgments for their outgoing TCP packets. This feature is tricked by fake ACK packets sent by helpers and, thus, labels all attack traffics as good, failing to defend. Overall, the advantages of combining the COSSACK and D-WARD systems were not as great as we expected since D-WARD detected all but ACK Proxy attacks, COSSACK missed a lot of attacks, and the joint system was driven by D-WARD's actions.
LESSONS LEARNED
This Red Team/Blue Team exercise confirmed that the defense systems offered effective protection against attacks they were designed to handle, but it revealed significant vulnerabilities when sophisticated attacks were deployed. The Blue Team benefited greatly from these results, which led to improvement of the defense design in the months following the exercise. All teams felt that a repetition of the exercise with improved defenses would be very valuable, but time and cost did not permit this.
All three experimental teams also made the following observations with regard to lessons learned:
1. Red Team reconnaissance and attack testing should occur on the network ultimately used for defense testing as any hardware changes compromise fine tuning of the attacks. The dependency of sophisticated DDoS attacks that rely on timing on particular hardware and network configurations that was demonstrated in this experiment suggests that running such attacks in the real Internet might be harder than we expect. 2. Experimental infrastructure must remain intact after execution; this is needed for answering questions raised in the data analysis by running additional experiments. All measurements taken during the exercise, and detailed packet traces, should be saved. 3. Attacks should be launched on an isolated network because it was observed that it was difficult to shut attacks off at the end of the runs. The Red Team had to insert a kill timer that would simply kill attack processes after a desired duration. 4. Scripted attacks are easier for logging and repeatability than live Red Team actions. However, the Red Team could likely have launched more effective attacks if it had live control and the ability to tune the attacks. Such an advantage would be enjoyed by real attackers. 5. Last-minute surprises should be budgeted for, both in time and money. Preparation of this exercise required extensive weekly teleconferences and several face-to-face meetings among all teams. Each phase of the exercise was longer (and thus cost more) than originally expected because the planned tasks proved more complex than anticipated. 6. Defense code must be frozen before reconnaissance.
Otherwise, the reconnaissance must be repeated after each change; this creates the "moving target" problem for the Red Team. Additionally, the Red Team observed that any DDoS defensive strategy that relies upon timing mechanisms or timing considerations is susceptible to attacks that are themselves based in timing. Adjusting the defensive timing values to thwart the specifics of one such attack is not a generalized response as the attackers are free to observe new defensive timing parameters and adjust their attacks accordingly. Similarly, tuning defensive parameters for responsiveness under one set of network traffic conditions does not provide a generalized defense against unpredictable network conditions. The Red Team believes that developers of defensive software technologies should work to remove such tuning requirements from their systems.
All teams agreed that attempting to recreate any sort of realistic DDoS test environment using only a very limited number of machines results in a highly artificial test environment because the limited infrastructure simply does not have enough nodes to effectively simulate the dynamics of real-world DDoS attacks. A standalone DDoS testbed, with several hundred or thousands of nodes and a core network mirroring today's Internet architecture of high-speed backbones bordered by autonomous systems, was deemed as the only realistic test infrastructure for DDoS attacks. Such a testbed has since been jointly funded by DHS and NSF through the DETER project [15] .
Finally, all teams felt that if a tighter interaction between participants were possible and, if all of the teams were involved in all phases of the exercise, the results could have been much more rewarding. If the Red Team were allowed to perform live attacks, they would have likely been much more effective. If the Blue Team were allowed to retune their software after a successful attack, there would have been a rapid improvement in the defense quality. This refined defense could then be retested to validate that the detected vulnerabilities were successfully handled and to look for new problems. Unfortunately, such an interactive exercise would have required a tremendous expenditure in time and funding and is an unrealistic goal. All teams felt that they gained valuable knowledge from this Red Team/ Blue Team exercise that they would not have been able to obtain otherwise and they are grateful for DARPA's support of this endeavor.
